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and without them it would cease
to exist as that object, then these
are the properties that an object
has essentially. With this basis
established, Brody sets out to determine what properties are essential for being human and at.
what point does a fetus have
these properties. He rejects the
theory that the fetus is human at
the moment of conception; for although the biological characteristics of the fetus have by then
been determined, it does not follow that the fetus already has all
these properties. "What the fetus
has is the chromosomal mechanism by which the properties are
finally produced. Therefore, it
does not follow that the fetus out
of which "A" will develop is identical with "A" and, like "A," is
a human being."
Brody takes his stand concerning the beginning of human life
from the opposite spectrum,
through an analysis of death.
Arguing from recent studies
about the time of death, Brody
says, "The traditional definition
of death, we could all agree, needs
to be modified one more time to
read: a person is dead only if
there has been an irreparable cessation of spontaneous and natural
cardiac and respiratory functions
and there has been an irreparable

cessation of brain function. But
suppose we have the latter condition without the former one,
wherein t he brain has ceased to
function but the heart and lungs
have not ... is the person dead
if his brain has suffered irreparable and massive damage whatever the state of his heart and
lungs?" To this question, Brody
would say yes, and so he concludes that there is only one property which is essential to humanity and that is the possession of a
brain that has not suffered an irreparable cessation of function.
He then maintains that the
fetus acquires the potential of essential humanity when the fetus
actuates the structures of a functioning brain, which comes at
about six weeks. While traditional Catholic thought would push
back the time of personhood even
further, Brody's position is certainly more plausible than the
Supreme Court's which has evaded the issue or put humanity at
the time of viability; and Brody's
chapter on "Abortion and the Supreme Court" is a lucid and logical critique on the Court's shoddy
thinking in this area.

Patrick F. and Carol A. Berger,
Ph.D.'s
St. Louis University
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In a very few pages, Harry
Harris, Galton Professor of Human Genetics, University of Lon116

don at University College at the
time the book was published, has
compiled technical information
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which should be valuable to a ny
generalist who has an interest in
genetic defects. The writing style
is clear, direct a n d easy to follow.
Professor Harris defines the
framework of his position at the
beginning in his Introduction. He
recognizes that the int roduction
of precise techniques for the prenatal diagnosis of a variety of different genetic defects represents
a new departure in medicine not
because of the nature of the techniques but because of the objective at which making the diagnosis is aimed. ·
Professor Harris attempts to
choose neutral language. He uses
the term "selective abortion" for
that carried out specifically because the foetus has been shown
to be either affected by or having
a high probability of being affected by a particular abnormality.
He also distinguishes between infants and children on one hand
and foetuses on the other because
of the desirability of differentiating clearly between the infant or
child after birth a nd what it is at
an earlier stage of development.
It is strange that Professor Harris, renowned as one of the
world's leading medical geneticists, ignores that the difference
in time and place that the stages
of development represent becomes a criterion for sepa rating
the affected foetus from the human family and from human concern. Thus, the t erms he prefers
are no less loaded than the ones
that stress the humanity of an
unborn child in the intrauterine
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stages of development.
The book defines the scope
of prenatal diagnosis describing
techniques of amniocentesis and
tissue culture as well as distributing pregnancies having the greatest risk of involving a severely
abnormal foetus into four main
diagnostic categories. These are
(1) chromosome abnormalities
diagnosed by cytogenetic techniques; (2) X-linked disorders
where sex determination is the
guide for action; (3 ) 'Inborn errors of metabolism' depending on
specific enzyme assay or other
biochemical characteristics; and
( 4) neural malformations such as
anencephaly or spina bifida where
estimation of alpha-foetoprotein
in amniotic fluid is informative.
Effects on the incidence of genetic disease of prenatal diagnosis
and selective abortion of abnormal foetuses are discussed concisely but thoroughly.
On ethics, Professor Harris
uses the forceful arguments of the
human geneticist Lejeune, discoverer of the chromosomal basis for
mongolism, to expound the traditional view that abortion is morally indefensible. He fails to
achieve balance because of the
advocacy of "selective abortion"
that permeates the book. The traditional position is characterized
by words of vaguely negative connotation such as " absolutist" or
" pat moralizing." Although acknowledging that Lejeune has
been careful to avoid taking his
stand on the basis of religious
doctrine, Harris defines Lejeune's
position as identical wit h the
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orthodox Roman Catholic position, the party line of orthodox
intellectual abortionism. He declares that moral attitudes toward abortion of the medical profession and other leading sections
of established society in England
and most parts of the U.S.A. have
undergone almost complete reversal in one or two generations
without stating the basis for his
generalizations. His suggestion
that those who would protect the
lives of the genetically-defective
unborn are less aware of the social

impact of such abnormal members is trite.
Prenatal Diagnosis and Selective Abortion can be a useful
book but the effect of such a book
on a generation of medical students and doctors trained in
medicine without an ethic could
be disastrous for an unsuspecting
society.
M. F. Jefferson, M.D.
President, National
Right-to-Life
Committee
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Behavior modification has come
under considerable legal attack in
settings ranging from prisons to
schools, and techniques ranging
from psychosurgery to token
economies. The issues are difficult and varied, and the disputes
they have occasioned are not likely to be easily resolved. Books
which attempt to summarize legal
developments in t his area for "the
practitioners of behavior change
and the administrators of such
programs in public institutions"
are therefore to be welcomed. The
danger in any such book, however, is that complex issues will
be made to appear simple, and
that general statements of the
"law" will sometimes be more
misleading t han informative.
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While much of this book is insightful and of high quality, it is
marred by its conceptual approach, its uncertain organization, its uneven organization, and
its uneven documentation.
The major difficulty arises from
the attempt to treat behavior
modification problems generically, dealing with programs in
"schools, corrections, and mental
health" as if the legal issues involved did not vary significantly,
depending upon the program's
setting. This problem is especially
troubling in the chapters on consent and records. What children,
prisoners, and mental patients
can consent to varies widely from
state to state, yet this fact is not
mentioned. The chapter on recLinacre Quarterly

